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INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets stand alone as the only major type of intellectual
property governed primarily by state law. Trademarks, copyrights,
and patents are each governed primarily by federal statutes. Trade
secrets, by contrast, are governed by fifty state statutes and
common laws. The result is that trade secret law differs from state
to state. It is time to eliminate these differences—and the
significant problems they cause—by enacting a Federal Trade
Secrets Act (“FTSA”).
An FTSA is the next logical step in the evolution of trade
secret law, which comprises a series of failed attempts to achieve
uniformity. These attempts include the Restatement of Torts in
1939,1 which consolidated general principles of case law for state
courts to embrace; the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) in
1985,2 which advanced a model statute for state legislatures to
enact; and the Economic Espionage Act in 1996,3 which
federalized criminal trade secret law. These attempts fall short
because they rely on an inherently variable state-based system (the
Restatement and UTSA) or because they unify only criminal trade
secret law (the Economic Espionage Act). The FTSA I propose in
this Article is a complete solution. It would both preempt

1
2
3

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (1939).
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006).
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inconsistent state laws and unify criminal and civil trade secret
law.
There are four reasons to enact an FTSA:
1. An FTSA would preempt state trade secret laws,
thereby solving the problems caused by
interstate differences. These problems include
costs of investigating these differences and
devising business plans to accommodate them;
economic inefficiencies from adopting and
overseeing either a suboptimal, one-size-fits-all
business plan or fifty optimal plans for fifty
different states; and many others.
2. There is no economic justification for keeping
trade secret law at the state level, while an
FTSA would boost the value of trade secret law
to the U.S. economy, innovative employers, and
mobile employees.
3. An FTSA would help innovative small
businesses, which rely disproportionately on
trade secrets, instead of patents, to protect their
intellectual property (or “IP”).
4. An FTSA would create a unified federal IP
regime. This will encourage innovation and
ensure a proper balance between trade secrets
and other types of IP.
I argue for an FTSA in three parts. Part I is the history of how
the current, state-based regime came about and why it fails to
achieve uniformity. Part II explains the four reasons for enacting
an FTSA. Part III lists the three arguments advanced against an
FTSA and explains why those arguments are unpersuasive. This
Article concludes with a summary of the proposed FTSA,
including the elements of an FTSA that are necessary to achieve
the four benefits described in Part II.
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I. PROLOGUE: THE HISTORY OF TRADE SECRET LAW IS A SERIES
OF FAILED ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY
Confidential business information is as old as business itself,
but “trade secrets” as such began in England in the early 1800s and
in the United States in the mid-to-late 1800s.4 By the early 1900s,
many core features of trade secret law had been established.5
The first attempt to unify the nascent law of trade secrets was
the Restatement of Torts in 1939.6 The Restatement summarized
general principles of law with the hope that state courts would
embrace those principles.7 The Restatement gained widespread
acceptance, but it failed to achieve uniformity because the
Restatement was not binding, and thus courts were free to accept
or reject its various principles.8 So while most state courts cited
4
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29 cmt. a (1995) (chronicling
the early history of trade secret law); Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade
Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual
Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 483–87 (2000–01) (discussing the
development of trade secrets and trade secret law) [hereinafter Fisk, Working
Knowledge].
5
1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2:3 (2008) (discussing the history of
trade secrets in U.S. courts).
6
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (1939). Neither the Restatement
(Second) of Torts nor Restatement (Third) of Torts contains a section on trade secrets.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts stated that the tort of trade secret
misappropriation had developed into its own area of law and thus required individual
treatment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, div. 9, introductory note (1979). The
current Restatement addressing trade secrets is the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (1995). The
rules in Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition are meant to apply to actions under
either the UTSA or common law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39
cmt. a.
7
The American Law Institute, which was responsible for promulgating the
Restatement (First) of Torts, was created to “address uncertainty in the law through a
restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and lawyers what the law was.”
American Law Institute, Institute Projects, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=about.instituteprojects (last visited Mar. 5, 2009); see also James Pooley, The Top Ten
Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (1997) [hereinafter Pooley, Top
Ten Issues].
8
See, e.g., Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277,
282 (1980–81) (“The Restatement was the first attempt to enunciate the generally
accepted principles of trade secrets law. Its principles became primary authority by
adoption in virtually every reported case.”). The National Conference cited uncertainty
in the law of trade secrets as one of the justifications for the UTSA. UNIF. TRADE

VOL19_BOOK3_ALMELING

2009]

4/21/2009 7:58:33 PM

FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS ACT

773

the Restatement, those courts adopted different principles to
different degrees. Another reason for the Restatement’s failure to
achieve uniformity was the uneven development of trade secret
law, as states in commercial centers developed extensive case law
while agricultural states had a leaner body of precedent.9
The next attempt to unify trade secret law, the UTSA,
abandoned the common law approach of the Restatement and
proposed a model statute for state legislatures to adopt. The UTSA
was proposed in 1968, adopted in 1979, and amended in 1985.10
Like the Restatement before it, the UTSA gained widespread
acceptance. It has been enacted, at least in part, by forty-six state
legislatures.11
The UTSA nonetheless fell short of its central purpose—to
“make uniform the law” of trade secrets.12 To begin with,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Texas have not
enacted it.13 These four states represent 22% of the U.S. Gross
Domestic Product.14 And even among the forty-six states that have
enacted it, differences remain because legislatures in those states
have modified the UTSA and courts in those states have adopted

SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005). The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is the group responsible for the Uniform
Commercial Code and other efforts to unify state law. Uniform Law Commission,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited
Mar. 5, 2009) (“The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
worked for the uniformity of state laws since 1892.”).
9
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005) (“[The]
development [of state trade secret law] has been uneven. Although there typically are a
substantial number of reported decisions in states that are commercial centers, this is not
the case in less populous and more agricultural jurisdictions.”).
10
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 369 (1985). For an analysis of
the UTSA, see Klitzke, supra note 8.
11
See JAGER, supra note 5, § 3:29 (providing citations to statutes in the forty-six states
that have enacted the UTSA).
12
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 656 (2005).
13
Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1633, 1650 n.99 (1998).
14
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH
SLOWED IN 2007: ADVANCE 2007 AND REVISED 2004–2006 GDP-BY-STATE ESTIMATES
(June
5,
2008),
available
at
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/
gdp_state/2008/pdf/gsp0608.pdf.
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different interpretations.15 These modifications and interpretations
have been catalogued elsewhere,16 but they include fundamental
differences about what constitutes a trade secret, what is required
to misappropriate it, and what remedies are available. Finally,
even in instances where states have enacted the UTSA, many state
courts continue to rely on their own common law instead of the
provisions of the UTSA.17 These and other facts caused a leading
commentator to call the UTSA the “non-Uniform Trade Secrets
Act,”18 and to suggest that “the state of trade secret law is today
more conflicting and uncertain than it was in 1979” when the
UTSA was adopted.19
This was not meant to be. By its own terms, the UTSA was
intended to achieve uniformity. Section 8 of the UTSA, titled
“Uniformity of Application and Construction,” provides that:
“[t]his [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
15

Lao, supra note 13, at 1649–50. “[T]he UTSA never won the support of all of the
states, and even the states that did not adopt the UTSA modified it, sometimes
substantially, before enactment. Consequently, despite the UTSA, the law on trade secret
misappropriation continues to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” Id.
16
See, e.g., 1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (2008)
[hereinafter MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS] (discussing states’ interpretations of the
UTSA); see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[1] (2008) [hereinafter POOLEY,
TRADE SECRETS]; Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., The Economic Espionage Act: A New
Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 191,
196 (1997) (“While most states have enacted the UTSA in some form, the trade secret
protection granted in each state is far from uniform relative to the other states.”); Rebel J.
Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 443–45
(1995).
17
See Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical
Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 201 (2009) (arguing that the persistent use of the Restatement
(First) of Torts is “remarkable considering the near-antiquity of the First Restatement, the
statutory pre-emption (in most states) of any common law cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation, and the ostensibly superseding treatment of trade secret doctrine in the
more recent (but seldom cited) Third Restatement of Unfair Competition”); Brandon B.
Cate, Saforo & Assocs., Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common Law Trade Secret
Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687, 714–15 (2000) (describing examples in which state
supreme courts have relied on state common laws instead of the statutory requirements
of the UTSA).
18
See Pooley, Top Ten Issues, supra note 7, at 1188.
19
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 16, § 2.03[1].
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Act among states enacting it.”20 Section 8 has failed. Several
states did not include section 8 in the version of the UTSA they
enacted.21 And in those states that have enacted it, courts often
bypass its mandate of uniformity and adopt minority views.22
The most recent step toward unification came in 1996 when
Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act,23 which makes
misappropriation of trade secrets a federal crime. Congress passed
the Act for several reasons, including the growing importance of
trade secrets and the failure of existing state or federal laws to curb
economic espionage (another name for trade secret
misappropriation).24 But the backdrop for the Act was Congress’s
frustration with state trade secret laws, which Congress
complained “protect[] proprietary economic information only
haphazardly.”25
Because the Act addressed only criminal
misappropriation, Senator Arlen Spector suggested the need for a
federal statute to address civil misappropriation: “We have been
made aware that available civil remedies may not be adequate to
the task and that a federal civil cause of action is needed. This is
an issue we need to study carefully, and will do so next year.”26
“Next year” came and went, and Congress has yet to consider a
civil FTSA.

20

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 656 (2005).
Examples of states that have not enacted section 8 of the UTSA include Arkansas,
Illinois, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607
(2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1 to 1065/9 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to 157 (2008); and 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301–08 (2008).
22
See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 790–92
(Wis. 2006) (recognizing that Wisconsin has enacted section 8 but nonetheless has
adopted a minority position on the issue of preemption).
23
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006).
24
H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4–7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023–
25.
25
S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 11 (1996).
26
104 CONG. REC. S12201, S12208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Spector).
21
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II. FOUR REASONS TO ENACT AN FTSA27
A. An FTSA Would Solve the Inherent and Intractable Problem:
There Can Be No Uniformity to a State-Based Trade Secret
Regime
The dominant failure of a state-based trade secret regime is that
trade secret law differs from state to state. Consequently, the most
obvious benefit of the FTSA is that it will instantly accomplish
what the common law, Restatement, UTSA, and Economic
Espionage Act have all failed to achieve—uniformity, both
substantive and procedural.
1. The Problems Caused by a Lack of Substantive and
Procedural Uniformity
There is no denying that trade secret law differs from state to
state. Nor is there denying the problems such differences cause,
the most obvious of which are the transaction costs such
differences impose on courts and parties. Litigants will use all
available arguments to their advantage, and thus they have an
incentive to find, emphasize, and litigate the variations in state
trade secret laws. This imposes costs on the courts, which must
resolve these differences. It also adds to the costs of litigation for
the litigants themselves, as they must expend resources finding and
litigating these differences.
Another problem is investigatory costs. When an entity
decides to create or protect trade secret information, the entity
must devise a plan. To devise an optimal plan, the entity must
investigate what laws protect what information.
These
27
In this Article I advance what I consider to be the most persuasive reasons to enact
an FTSA. This Article does not seek to present all reasons that ostensibly support an
FTSA. For example, some commentators argue that the current trade secret regime
causes the U.S. to breach its treaty obligations under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) because NAFTA and TRIPS set higher standards than those
used in non-UTSA states. See, e.g., Lao, supra note 13, at 1674–79; Pace, supra note 16,
at 449–56. This concern, however, is more theoretical than practical. Since NAFTA was
signed in 1992 and TRIPS in 1994, there have been no complaints on this issue from any
trading partners.

VOL19_BOOK3_ALMELING

2009]

4/21/2009 7:58:33 PM

FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS ACT

777

investigatory costs are particularly daunting for companies that do
business in multiple states, for those companies must investigate
the laws in each state.28 But these costs also affect all companies,
as the vagaries of personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues
mean that a trade secret owner rarely knows ex ante which
jurisdiction’s laws will control. Similarly, when employees move
to new jobs, or when members of the public decide to access and
use purported trade secrets, they must investigate to decide
whether the information is protected. To be sure, not every entity,
employee, or member of the public investigates differences, either
because they suspect that any differences would be immaterial or
because the investigatory costs are too high. But the point is that
differences impose costs either way. Being risk averse and making
an informed decision imposes the costs of investigating
differences. Taking risks and making uninformed decisions also
imposes costs, as uncertainty about which law applies leads to
more litigation and fewer settlements.
Even if an entity absorbs the requisite investigatory costs,
interstate differences still cause economic inefficiencies in at least
two ways. One is the simple fact that implementing different trade
secret plans for different states imposes unnecessary overhead.
The other is that, if a company foregoes this overhead and adopts a
company-wide plan, the plan is suboptimal because it works better
in some states than others. For example, while every state requires
a trade secret owner to engage in efforts that are reasonable to
maintain the secrecy of its trade secrets, what constitutes
“reasonable efforts” can differ from state to state.29 The upshot of
these differences is either the wasteful expenditure of resources
28

See, e.g., Pace, supra note 16, at 447 (making a similar argument that devising an
approach to confidentiality “requires a company to expend significant resources on
acquiring information about which states’ laws might apply to its trade secret and what
those laws are”).
29
See generally David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the
Concept “Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy,” 5 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321 (1989) (discussing what legal and situational
efforts are required of a trade secret owner to determine reasonableness). Both the
Restatement (First) of Torts and the UTSA impose an obligation on the trade secret
owner to engage in reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of its trade secret.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14
U.L.A. 656 (2005).
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(i.e., engaging in efforts that are unnecessary) or the loss of rights
(i.e., foregoing efforts that turn out to be necessary). And while an
owner may be tempted to adopt a plan that meets the strictest
standard, that too is inefficient. Complying with the strictest
common denominator means that the owner expends additional
resources that it knows are unnecessary in at least some
jurisdictions.30
Finally, interstate differences systematically encourage a series
of bad results: trade secret owners engage in less innovation;
nefarious agents misappropriate trade secrets more often; and the
public under-uses the public domain. Trade secret owners must
decide whether to create and protect trade secret information. If
protection is uncertain, or if it can be realized only after expensive
litigation to resolve those uncertainties, the rational trade secret
owner would undervalue trade secrets and thus may be less likely
to innovate since that innovation will not be as valuable.31 The
opposite is true for the nefarious agent. If trade secret law is
uncertain or expensive to enforce, the nefarious agent may seek to
exploit those uncertainties by taking the risk that the trade secret
owner will not enforce its rights. There is thus an inverse
relationship, all things being equal, between clarity of enforcement
and likelihood of misappropriation. Finally, for the public and
former employees interested in pursuing information in the public
domain, uncertainty regarding whether information is a trade secret
makes that information less attractive.32 In such cases, the scope
of a trade secret creeps beyond appropriately protected trade secret
information and covers public-domain information.
2. An FTSA Would Achieve Substantive Uniformity
I will not catalogue all substantive differences among the
states’ trade secret laws, as there are simply too many to mention.
30

See Pace, supra note 16, at 447 (making a similar efficiency argument).
See id. at 447–48 (making a similar argument that uncertainty creates less incentive
to innovate).
32
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 338 (2008) (“If any idea, no matter how public, is subject to a claim of
legal rights, individuals and companies will reasonably worry about using any
information they do not themselves develop.”).
31
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A complete list of these differences can be found elsewhere, such
as in the annually updated, two-volume Trade Secrets: A State-byState Survey,33 or in previous articles that have critiqued interstate
differences and called for uniformity.34
Instead, I will state the obvious point that an FTSA would
achieve substantive uniformity by preempting nonuniform state
laws, which, in turn, would solve the significant problems such
differences cause. To be fair, there is debate about the scope of
these problems, with some commentators arguing that any
problems are minor.35 There is no clear resolution to this debate,
as the problems are based on economic theory and thus difficult to
quantify. The bottom line is this. If substantive differences create
significant problems, an FTSA would be of tremendous benefit.
But even if these problems were minor, an FTSA would still confer
a benefit, albeit a smaller one.

33

Brian M. Malsberger, TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Richard Alfred
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
34
See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments
to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 656–
57 (2008) (“The time has come for the enactment of a federal trade secrets statute.”);
Lao, supra note 13, at 1649–79 (arguing for federalization based on the lack of
uniformity between states, the importance of trade secrets to interstate commerce, the
complexity of choice-of-law problems, and treaty obligations); Pace, supra note 16, at
442–56 (arguing for an FTSA based on the need for substantive unity and compliance
with treaty obligations); Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act: The States’ Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 95 (1990)
(“[C]onsideration should be given to a federal statute to provide uniformity and clarity . .
. .”). See generally Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1971) (arguing for a federal statute based in part on lack of
uniformity and preemption concerns).
35
See, e.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AIPLA TRADE
SECRETS
COMMITTEE
(2007),
available
at
http://www.aipla.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Section=Proposal_to_Federalize_Trade_Secret_
Law&Site=Trade_Secret_Law&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&C
ontentID=7041 [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT] (claiming that the UTSA has resulted in
significant harmonization); Halligan, supra note 34, at 670 (“[T]he UTSA has, for the
most part, resulted in a very coherent and consistent body of trade secret law . . .
[despite the fact that] there are still some glaring holes and discrepancies [among the
states].”).
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3. An FTSA Would Achieve Procedural Uniformity
Each state has its own rules of civil procedure. Rules of civil
procedure differ between states as well as between state courts and
federal courts. For trade secret owners and their lawyers, and for
alleged misappropriators and their lawyers, procedural disparities
cause significant problems. Enacting an FTSA would solve these
problems because an FTSA would include certain procedural rules
specific to trade secrets. The UTSA has several such rules,
including rules regarding protective orders and a statute of
limitations.36 And where the FTSA would be silent, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would provide a uniform set of default
procedures.
To illustrate the importance of procedural differences, consider
the following three examples. First, states have different rules
regarding if, when, and how plaintiffs must identify their alleged
trade secrets.37 “With all other types of IP, the subject matter is
identified in publicly available material—a registered copyright or
trademark, an issued patent, or a publicly available product.”38 But
trade secrets, by definition, are secret and not publicly available
and thus must be identified at some point in a trade secret case.
While the identification issue comes up in every case, there is no
consensus about when or how plaintiffs must identify their trade
secrets.39 As a court recently stated, “courts have developed at
least nine different approaches to the problem.”40 Identifying trade
secrets is a big issue for both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs
often want to avoid identifying and thus limiting their trade secrets.

36

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 5–6, 14 U.L.A. 647–50 (2005).
Darin W. Snyder & David S. Almeling, Trade Secrets: The Identification Issue,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://www.omm.com/files/upload/
IdentificationIssue.pdf.
38
Id.; see Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret
Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
68, 73 (2006).
39
See Graves & Range, supra note 38, at 79–91 (cataloging ways and times in which
courts do or do not require the identification of the allegedly misappropriated trade
secret); Snyder & Almeling, supra note 37 (describing the trend that courts increasingly
require plaintiffs to identify with particularity each allegedly misappropriated trade secret
during the early stages of discovery).
40
DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
37
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Defendants often want plaintiffs to identify the alleged trade
secrets as early and precisely as possible to frame the scope of
discovery and to enable defendants to prepare their defenses. It
thus makes a significant difference whether a trade secret case is in
a state like California, which requires by statute that the plaintiff
must identify its trade secrets before discovery commences,41 or in
a state like New York, which has no such statute and has been
reluctant to impose a strict burden of identification.42
A second procedural difference concerns whether the UTSA,
enacted in some form in forty-six states, preempts causes of action
for misappropriation of confidential information when that
information does not qualify as a trade secret. There is a split of
authority on this issue.43 A few states, such as Wisconsin,44 find
no preemption, while most states, such as New Hampshire, find
preemption.45 These differences are important because they
determine what causes of action a plaintiff can assert and what
remedies are available.
The third difference relates to choice-of-law problems. Since
trade secret law is state-based, many cases require a choice-of-law
analysis to determine what substantive law to apply, the
appropriate forum, and what remedies are available.46 As a
litigator of trade secret cases, I have found that choice-of-law
issues arise frequently and require substantial work. An FTSA
would solve these problems because choice-of-law issues arise
41

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210.
See, e.g., Norbrook Labs., Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., No.
5:03CV165(HGM/GLS), 2003 WL 1956214, at *3–4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003); see also
Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 370–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
43
See generally Michael Ahrens, Wisconsin Confidential: The Mystery of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision in Burbank Grease Services v. Sokolowski and its
Effect upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Litigation, and Employee Mobility, 2007 WIS.
L. REV. 1271 (2007) (discussing a Wisconsin court’s holding that the USTA-based
Wisconsin statute did not preempt Wisconsin civil law); Robert Unikel, Bridging the
“Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of
Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841 (1998) (discussing the protection of confidential
information in courts).
44
See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006).
45
See, e.g., Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652 (N.H. 2006).
46
See JAGER, supra note 5, §§ 4:6–4:8 (describing the range of choice-of-law issues
that must be decided in each trade secret case).
42
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only when state laws differ, and an FTSA would preempt those
differences. To be sure, there would continue to be choice-of-law
issues that accompany trade secret litigation, such as if the
complaint asserts theories under state employment or contract law.
But removing the choice-of-law problems related to trade secret
law will decrease the frequency with which these issues arise.47
B. There is No Economic Reason to Keep Trade Secret Law at the
State Level; but There are Many Economic Reasons to Make it
Federal
I have found no persuasive economic argument that supports
keeping trade secret law as state law instead of federal law. This is
likely because there is nothing about trade secrets that is limited to
a particular state. Instead, trade secrets are information (a
customer list, formula, method, etc.),48 and information exists
wherever it is accessed or used.
Nor is there anything
geographically limited about trade secret law. A trade secret
owner has an interest in its trade secret against anyone who
misappropriates it within the applicable jurisdiction. If the
jurisdiction is a state, rights are limited to that state. But if the
jurisdiction is federal—as it would be under an FTSA—rights are
nationwide. Trade secrets thus present an even more compelling
case for federalization than trademarks. In trademark law, the
47
I do not claim that an FTSA would eliminate all forum shopping. Nor do I claim
that there won’t be regional differences if an FTSA is adopted, as regional courts of
appeals may apply different interpretations of the FTSA. Instead, I submit that if an
FTSA is enacted, there will no longer be differences between trade secret laws in
different states. I further submit that the differences between varying interpretations of
an FTSA in different federal circuits is likely to be less significant than the current
differences in statutory trade secret laws in different states, and that varying
interpretations of the FTSA would be short-lived as the U.S. Supreme Court could grant
certiorari to resolve such differences.
48
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id.
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original trademark owner can have rights to a trademark that are
confined to a particular location, such as a town or state; another
trademark owner can have rights to the same trademark in another
location.49 Trade secrets are never so limited.
In sharp contrast to the lack of economic justification for the
status quo, there would be substantial economic benefits to an
FTSA. The most immediate is the large and growing importance
of trade secrets to the U.S. economy.50 Estimates vary, but the
most recent report is that as much as 75% of the market value of a
U.S. company resides in its IP assets.51 As strong evidence of the
value of trade secrets, corporations spent $95 billion in 2005 trying
to protect their confidential information.52 Yet thefts continue.
The best available data shows that in 2005, more than 60% of U.S.
companies reported an attempt to compromise their trade secret
information.53 In quantifying the costs of trade secret losses, some
statistics place the amount as high as $300 hundred billion per
year.54 To provide examples for these numbers, consider the trade
49
See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 26 (4th ed. 2008) (detailing the territorial rules regarding trademark
rights).
50
MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 167
(2008) (arguing, based on survey evidence from R&D lab and company managers, “that
outside the pharmaceutical industry, where the regulatory system effectively forces
revelation, trade secrecy is considerably more important than patent”).
51
ASIS INTERNATIONAL, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 1 (2007),
available at http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf. ASIS International is
a professional organization for security professionals. Id. It conducted seven surveys
since 1991, with the 2007 survey being the most recent. Id.
52
Joseph Pisani, Spy vs. Spy: Corporate Espionage, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2006/tc20060929_557426.htm
(citing a study from Freedonia Group, a market research company).
53
ASIS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 51, at 2.
54
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2002 vii
(2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/2002.pdf.
Other studies find different
numbers, depending on their methodology. See also AM. SOC’Y FOR INDUS.
SEC./PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS: SURVEY
REPORT (1999) (reporting $45 billion in costs due to theft of trade secrets); HEDIEH
NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 59 (2004) (citing several studies
concerning losses to the U.S. economy from trade secrets, including one conducted by
ASIS estimating the loss at $300 billion); The Costs of Corporate Espionage, Posting to
The
Trade
Secrets
Blog,
http://thetradesecretsblog.wordpress.
com/2007/12/03/the-costs-of-corporate-espionage/ (Dec. 3, 2007).
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secret formula for Coca-Cola,55 or consider trade secret cases that
have settled for hundreds of millions of dollars.56
The development of our information-based economy is further
justification for an FTSA. The U.S. economy is increasingly based
on ideas and information,57 and companies increasingly rely on IP
rights to protect their competitive advantages.58 Among the various
types of IP, trade secrets are well suited to protect new ideas and
information because trade secret law is not limited to a particular
subject matter.59 Any information can qualify as a trade secret.60
This flexibility makes trade secrets a good form of protection for
rapidly evolving technologies. As noted by one prominent
commentator on trade secret law, “trade secrets have gained
importance because in many fields, the technology is changing so

55

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289
(D. Del. 1985) (“The complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept trade secrets
in the world.”); see also Coca-Cola Still World’s Top Brand, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4706275.stm (discussing Coca-Cola’s value).
56
See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, $1.1 Billion TRUCE Surprise End to Feud over Trade
TODAY,
Jan.
10,
1997,
at
1B,
available
at
Secrets,
USA
http://www.me.utexas.edu/~me179/topics/tradesecrets/case2articles/case2article3.html
(discussing a $1.1 billion settlement involving trade secrets).
57
See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 839, 857 (2005) [hereinafter Fisk, Knowledge Work].
Virtually every observer from every possible perspective agrees that
changes in the economy of industrial and postindustrial nations and
the world as a whole have increased the importance of intellectual
capital. . . . Compared to fifty years ago, even those who still sell or
manufacture things (as opposed to knowledge) spend a greater
proportion of dollars per unit of output on knowledge than they do on
raw materials or labor.
Id.
58
See generally Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Property Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 7 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
59
Michael A. Epstein, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.02[E] (5th ed. Supp.
2009) (“One of the advantages arising from the standards required for a trade secret to
exist is that . . . there is no specific subject matter criterion for a trade secret.”).
60
Id. (“As long as the definitional requirements are met, virtually any subject matter of
information can be a trade secret.” (citation omitted)); see also MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS, supra note 16, § 1.01[1] (discussing the definition of a trade secret).
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rapidly that it is outstripping the existing laws intended to
encourage and protect inventions and innovations.”61
This explanation is not pure speculation. Rather, it is the
justification articulated by Congress for passing the Economic
Espionage Act62 and federalizing criminal trade secret law.63
Congress stated: “As this Nation moves into the high-technology,
information age, the value of these intangible assets will only
continue to grow.”64 Since then, U.S. government reports have
confirmed that, as the U.S. economy continues to depend more on
IP such as trade secrets, the need to protect such IP continues to
increase.65 These considerations are not limited to criminal trade
secret law, and thus they apply equally to the FTSA I propose.
And while the Economic Espionage Act is an important step in
trade secret law, it does not obviate the need for a civil trade
secrets act for a host of reasons. These reasons include: volume
(there have been less than 100 cases under the Act); the Act does
not provide for civil damages; the prosecutor, not the victim trade
secret owner, decides whether to initiate prosecution; and there is a
significantly higher burden of proof for criminal conviction than
civil liability.66
Technological change is another reason to pass an FTSA.
Trade secret thefts were at one time local and involved the breach
of a particular physical location. The Internet and computer
networking mean that misappropriators can now breach security

61

JAGER, supra note 5, § 1:1.
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006).
63
Id. § 1832; see S. REP. 104-359, at 6–7 (1996).
64
S. REP. 104-359, at 6 (1996).
65
See generally NAT’L INTELL. PROP. L. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION COUNCIL,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION (2006), available at http://www.
commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Gutierrez/2006_Releases/September/2006%20IP%20
report.pdf (discussing the importance of enforcing intellectual property rights in order to
protect and encourage the development of innovations in fields such as technology,
health, and safety).
66
For a good discussion of these limitations of the Economic Espionage Act, and why
these and other limitations counsel in favor of federalizing trade secret law, see Halligan,
supra note 34, at 661–76.
62
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from anywhere in the world.67 The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act68 is evidence of this worldwide threat and the need for national
legislation. The Act, enacted in 1984, imposes civil and criminal
liability for a wide variety of intentional, unauthorized access to
computers. It is not, however, a substitute for trade secret law.
An FTSA would not only protect companies, it would also
benefit employees. This dual benefit is no accident, as the goals of
trade secret law are both to protect employers “by providing
remedies for the misuse of confidential information” and to benefit
employees “by defining and legitimizing zones of information that
mobile employees may freely take from job to job.”69 An FTSA
would protect employees for the same reasons it would protect
employers. It would provide clear, uniform rules so that both
employers and employees can be certain about what constitutes a
trade secret and what can be taken from job to job. Protecting
employee mobility is critical because Americans are increasingly
mobile. One government study found that a person who was born
in the later years of the baby boom would hold, on average, 10.8
jobs from age eighteen to age forty-two.70
C. An FTSA Would Help Innovative Small Businesses, Which Rely
Disproportionately on Trade Secrets to Protect Their IP
Study after study confirms that small businesses rely
disproportionately on trade secrets, instead of patents, to protect
their innovations.71
The reasons for this are cost and
67

See ERIC M. DOBRUSIN & RONALD A. KRASNOW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CULTURE: STRATEGIES TO FOSTER SUCCESSFUL PATENT AND TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN
EVERYDAY BUSINESS 234 (2008) (“With [new ideas and the Internet] also grew the
opportunity for misappropriation of the ideas and the technological means for achieving
such misappropriations.”).
68
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
69
Graves & Range, supra note 38, at 44.
70
Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor, Number
of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth among the Youngest Baby
Boomers: Results from a Longitudinal Survey 1 (June 27, 2008), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf.
71
See Cohen, supra note 58, at 14–16; MARY ELLEN MOGEE, SMALL BUS. ADMIN,
FOREIGN PATENTING BEHAVIOR OF SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS: AN UPDATE 5 (2003),
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs228_tot.pdf (collecting studies that find that small
businesses use the patent system less often and less effectively than large businesses);
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sophistication. Patents are expensive to obtain, keep, and enforce,
and they require sophisticated legal counsel at each step.72 Small
businesses are less likely to know about and be able to bear these
costs.73
In contrast, there are no formal requirements to obtaining a
trade secret, as trade secrets exist without any specific filing
procedure.74 The only time that a trade secret must be identified is
when it is used, such as in litigation or licensing. And while
keeping a trade secret does require efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to ensure its secrecy, reasonableness is a
flexible, relatively lax standard.75 Patents, by contrast, require the
monitoring and payment of maintenance fees (due 3½, 7½ and
11½ years after issuance of the patent) that, if missed, can result in
the loss of rights.76 Finally, at enforcement, trade secret litigation
is less expensive than patent litigation.77
All of these
considerations make trade secrets an attractive alternative for small
businesses.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS GAO-02-189,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FEDERAL ACTION NEEDED TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES ADDRESS
FOREIGN
PATENT
CHALLENGES
21–24
(2002),
http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02789.pdf (describing numerous reasons why small businesses have more
difficulty than large businesses obtaining foreign patents) [hereinafter U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE]; see also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development, 18 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783
(1987) (discussing which industries require patent protection and which require trade
secret protection); Roger M. Milgrim, Sear to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other
Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17 (1971) (discussing the distinction between trademarks and
trade secrets).
72
Cohen, supra note 58, at 14–16.
73
MOGEE, supra note 71, at 5–6; see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 71, at
21–24; David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 61, 63 (1991)
74
See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179–80
(7th Cir. 1991).
75
Id. at 179–80 (“[Reasonableness] depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that
will vary from case to case . . . .”).
76
35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006).
77
See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 25–26 (2007)
(reporting the average cost of various types of IP litigation, and showing that the cost to
take a high-end patent litigation to trial costs about $5 million per side while the same
statistic for high-end trade secret litigation is $1.75 million per side).

VOL19_BOOK3_ALMELING

788

4/21/2009 7:58:33 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:769

There is also evidence that trade secret theft threatens small
businesses more than large ones.78 There could be several reasons
for this. One is that small businesses are less stable and experience
more employee turnover, creating more opportunities for theft
from departing employees. Another is that small businesses have
fewer resources to weather the loss of trade secret information,
especially if that information was the source of the business’s
competitive advantage.
There are many reasons to help small businesses protect their
IP. Small businesses are an undeniably important part of the U.S.
economy, as more than 99% of American businesses are small
businesses and those businesses account for more than half of U.S.
GDP.79 Small businesses are also a significant part of the
innovative economy, as their size and culture make them nimble
and able to respond to change. Empirical studies confirm the
disproportionate role small businesses play in innovation, as
statistics show they develop thirteen times more patents per
employee than large businesses.80
D. An FTSA is Necessary to Create a Unified Federal IP Regime,
Which in Turn Will Advance Innovation Policy
Because trade secrets are the only major type of IP not already
governed primarily by federal law, adopting an FTSA would
consolidate IP law in the hands of Congress and the federal courts.
Before addressing why IP should be consolidated at the federal
level, it is important to explain why this has not been done already.
The U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1787 and contained a
clause for patents and copyrights.81 Their inclusion was not
surprising because both had long-established statutory predicates.
78
See STEVEN FINK, STICKY FINGERS: MANAGING THE GLOBAL RISK OF ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE 198 (2002). Fink describes survey data that “small-sized to medium-sized
businesses suffer the most significant losses.” Id.
79
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, FOR DATA YEAR 2006: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1, 9 (2007), available at http://www.sba.gov/
advo/research/sb_econ2007.pdf.
80
CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SMALL SERIAL
INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 3 (2003),
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf.
81
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Copyright law dates back to England’s Statute of Anne in 1710.82
And early patent laws included the Venetian Statute of 147483 and
England’s Statute of Monopolies in 1623.84 Trademark law, by
contrast, was not included in the U.S. Constitution. This omission
was due, at least in part, to the fact that trademark law only gained
prominence after the U.S. Constitution was adopted. Beginning in
the early 1800s, courts expanded the torts of fraud and deceit to
include trademark-like rights, and by 1850 rules regarding
trademark infringement were well accepted.85 Shortly thereafter in
1870, Congress passed the first federal trademark Act.86 While
that Act was held unconstitutional, Congress subsequently passed
narrower federal trademark acts in 1881 and 1905, and the
expanded, modern trademark Act in 1946.87 The purpose of the
1946 Act “was to codify and unify the common law of unfair
competition and trademark protection.”88
Trade secret law is the newest type of IP. As detailed in Part I,
it was recognized in America in the mid-to-late 1800s and gained
prominence in the early 1900s. The evolution of trade secret law
thus resembles (with a lag) trademark law. That is, trade secret
law began in common law and gradually developed as it became
more important. It is time for trade secret law to complete its
evolution, like trademark law, with a federal statute.
By consolidating the four types of IP law at the federal level,
an FTSA would be the final step toward a unified IP regime. This
unification would, in turn, help achieve better innovation policy
82

Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
See Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Juridical Origins of the International Patent System:
Towards a Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization, 5 J. HIST. INT’L L.
403, 413–14 (2003).
84
Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
85
MCCARTHY, supra note 49, § 5:2 (chronicling the history of trademark law in
England and the United States).
86
See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879) (“[T]he first . . . attempt
by Congress to regulate the right of trade-marks is to be found in the act of July 8,
1870.”).
87
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 847 n.1 (1982). For more
information on the development of trademark law, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 617–19 (2006).
88
Inwood, 456 U.S. at 861 n.2 (White, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333
(1946)) (emphasis added).
83
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because it would consolidate in one entity—first Congress, and
then the federal courts—the power to define the scope of all major
categories of IP. Congress legislates in the patent,89 trademark,90
and copyright91 arenas and oversees the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office92 and the U.S. Copyright Office.93 These roles make
Congress well positioned to craft and delimit an FTSA to work in
tandem with the other types of IP law.
After an FTSA is enacted, the federal courts would further
Congress’s efforts to advance a better innovation policy. The
courts’ role is important because, as the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized, the core purpose of both patent and trade secret law is
to provide incentives to invent.94 A successful innovation policy is
the core but not the sole aim of trade secret law. Other goals
include reducing protection costs, ensuring privacy, and permitting
employee mobility.95 Trade secret law is thus complex and, at
times, conflicting. For example, the policy of encouraging a
company to innovate (by having strong rights to protect trade
secrets) conflicts with the policy of permitting employee mobility
(by having weaker rights so employees can take knowledge from
job to job). To complicate matters further, trade secret law can

89

35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006) (federal patent statute).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006) (federal trademark statute).
91
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (federal copyright statute).
92
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009) (explaining background of the U.S. Patent & Trademark office).
93
U.S. Copyright Office, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2009) (explaining background of the U.S. Copyright office).
94
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–84 (1974) (discussing
objectives of patent and trade secret law); see also Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and
Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 207, 211–13 (2008) (“Consequently, trade secret protection involves the same
fundamental policy choices between favoring innovation and favoring competition as
laws protecting other forms of IP.”); Lemley, supra note 32, at 331 (discussing Kewanee
and arguing that trade secret law serves to incentivize innovation).
95
See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 16, § 1.02 (listing and discussing the
various policies behind trade secret law). I accept the commonly held belief that trade
secret law incentivizes companies to innovate. I nonetheless note that there is no
universal agreement that trade secret law achieves this goal. See generally Robert G.
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 241 (1998) (arguing that trade secret law lacks a convincing policy justification).
90
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overlap with other types of IP.96 The result is that IP law requires
courts to engage in a delicate balance to protect the rights of IP
holders without unduly limiting the rights of others. Again,
consolidating the weighing of these decisions in the hands of the
federal courts, which already have expertise in the other areas of IP
law, would lead to even greater expertise. It would also remove
trade secret law from the state courts, which at present is the only
major type of IP law over which the states have primary
jurisdiction.
In sum, an FTSA would not only result in a uniform and
consistent trade secret regime, but by placing trade secret
regulation in the hands of Congress and the federal courts, it would
also ensure that the major forms of IP—patent, trademark,
copyright, and trade secret—are all part of a cohesive national IP
policy.
III. THREE REASONS NOT TO ENACT AN FTSA, AND WHY THOSE
REASONS ARE UNPERSUASIVE
To assess the merits of an FTSA, one must balance the reasons
for enactment with those against it. Indeed, arguments against an
FTSA prevailed when proposals for some form of federal trade
secret law were presented to the American Bar Association’s
Section of Intellectual Property in 199297 and the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) in 2007.98 This

96

See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 472–93 (discussing the interaction between
patent law and trade secret protection).
97
Resolution 410-1 read in full: “RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Law favors in principle the passage of a federal law (preempting state law)
for the protection of trade secrets; and specifically, the Section favors the passage of such
a law based upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” 1992–93 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L.
ANN. REP. 1, 329. But a federal trade secret law was rejected in 1992, and was not
proposed in 1993 because “additional evaluation . . . [needed to] be made of the benefits
and detriments of federal trade secret protection before any such resolution . . . [should]
again [be] submitted.” Id.
98
AIPLA REPORT, supra note 35 (“Based on the information it has obtained and
reviewed, the Committee does not at this time recommend any federal legislation focused
on trade secret law.”).
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Part of the Article summarizes the three main arguments against an
FTSA and demonstrates that those arguments are not persuasive.99
Before those arguments, however, I address the (non)argument
that trade secret law has long been a state-based law, and since the
system isn’t broken, there is no reason to fix it. For example, the
AIPLA argued that “current state regulation of trade secrets . . . is
functioning adequately. . . .”100 This reasoning fails because the
system is broken for the four reasons detailed above, which
demonstrate that the state-based system has not kept up with our
information-based economy and should be replaced. So while
there may be three reasons not to enact an FTSA, inertia is not one
of them.
A. An FTSA Would Not Harm the Principle of Federalism
Opponents of an FTSA make constitutional and policy
arguments based on federalism. The constitutional argument—
federalizing trade secret law is an unconstitutional usurpation of
state sovereignty—has already failed. In 1996, Congress passed
the Economic Espionage Act, which makes misappropriation of
trade secrets a federal crime.101 In doing so, Congress recognized
that it was federalizing a new type of IP: “For many years federal
law has protected intellectual property through the patent and
copyright laws. With this legislation, Congress will extend vital
federal protection to another form of proprietary economic
information—trade secrets.”102 Since its passage, no one has
claimed that Congress did not have the authority to federalize trade
secret law. And any such challenge would surely fail because, as
detailed above in Part I.B, trade secrets have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and would thus easily qualify under the

99

Rejections by the ABA and AIPLA do not end the debate because these rejections
did not address all of the reasons this Article advances. See, e.g., id. (considering only
arguments for substantive uniformity, judicial efficiency, and compliance with
international treaties).
100
Id.
101
See supra text accompanying note 3.
102
H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4022–
23; see also S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 5 (1996).
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Commerce Clause.103 A federalism challenge would also fail
because, in addition to the Economic Espionage Act, there are
many federal statutes that touch on trade secrets and pass
constitutional muster.104 These include the National Stolen
Property Act105 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.106
The federalism policy argument—there are benefits to a statebased trade secret law that would be lost upon federalization—is
also unpersuasive. This argument ignores the economic realities
explained in Part II.B that a state-based trade secret regime is
incompatible with both the informational nature and national
economic implications of trade secrets. This argument also fails as
an empirical matter. The primary policy argument is that states
have unique issues that require unique solutions, and that states
should be laboratories to experiment and devise solutions. The
fact that forty-six states have passed the UTSA, however,
empirically shows that states value uniform trade secrets laws over
experimental ones. And while there are differences between states,
these differences arise haphazardly and with little recognition or
justification of the differences.
A final, federalism-based argument is that trade secret law is
closely connected to other state-based laws, such as breach of
contract (if the misappropriation is also governed by contract, such
as nondisclosure, noncompetition, nonsolicitation, employment, or
invention-assignment agreements), breach of fiduciary duty (if the
misappropriation would violate a duty owed to the trade secret
owner), employment law (if the misappropriation was by an
employee), or torts (if the misappropriation involves another tort,

103

See Lao, supra note 13, at 1679–90 (arguing that a civil FTSA would be
constitutional under either the Commerce Clause or the Foreign Affairs Clause). In the
Senate Report accompanying the Economic Espionage Act, the Senate based its authority
to pass the Act on both the IP Clause and the Commerce Clause. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at
4 (1996); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (IP Clause); id. cl. 3 (Commerce Clause). The
former seems hard to justify for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this
Article. The Commerce Clause, however, provides a complete and sufficient basis for
federal action.
104
See generally Jerry Cohen, Federal Issues in Trade Secret Law, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1
(2003).
105
National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15 (2006).
106
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
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such as interference with contractual or business relations). One
could argue that since these laws are state-based, keeping trade
secret law at the state level would further a unified contract,
fiduciary, employment, and tort policy. This criticism falls short
because in each of the other state-based laws there is something
else at play besides the trade secret itself, such as a contract,
fiduciary duty, employment obligation, or tort. These laws have
different elements and serve different purposes. Trade secret laws,
by contrast, are a type of IP law and thus would benefit from
having Congress and the federal courts as the unified voice of IP
policy.
B. An FTSA Would Not Overburden the Federal Judiciary
Some commentators argue that providing federal subjectmatter jurisdiction for civil trade secret cases would overburden
the federal judiciary.107 While it’s true that federal courts are busy
and becoming busier,108 the pertinent question is not whether an
FTSA would add to the caseload of the federal judiciary, for it
surely would. Instead, the question is whether federal or state
courts are better able to handle the burden of trade secret litigation.
The answer is federal courts, as the data have long shown that state
courts have more cases, their dockets are growing at a faster rate,
and they have fewer resources.109 Given these statistics, the issue
of caseload actually supports enacting an FTSA.
Another argument based on burden is that providing a federal
forum for all trade secret cases would cause a concomitant rise in

107

See, e.g., AIPLA REPORT, supra note 35 (“Others have argued, and the Committee
agrees, that the current state regulation of trade secrets, although far from perfect, is
functioning adequately and that federalizing state trade secret law would, therefore,
needlessly burden the already overworked federal judiciary.”).
108
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 9–10 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM
(describing the burden of the federal courts and how federal caseload is exceeding the
creation of new judgeships).
109
See, e.g., John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal
Case Out of It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 151–52 (2003)
(describing each of these factors and the data that support them); Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1977).
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other types of litigation through supplemental jurisdiction.110 It is
this supplemental jurisdiction, one could argue, that would impose
the burden on federal courts, as many trade secret cases include
other state-based causes of action. Even if true, this criticism still
supports enacting an FTSA because it would only further relieve
the greater burden faced by state courts. Moreover, this criticism
is a strong argument against exclusive jurisdiction, which would
require all trade secret cases, and their supplemental causes of
action, to be heard in federal court. Federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction in patent and copyright cases.111 This criticism does
not apply to concurrent jurisdiction, as I propose, which would
permit both state and federal courts to hear trade secret cases.
Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in trademark
cases.112
It also warrants noting that an FTSA would enhance judicial
efficiency by removing the substantive and procedural differences
identified in Part II.A. Accordingly, while the raw number of trade
secret cases would increase in federal courts, part of the burden of
those cases (i.e., addressing substantive and procedural differences
and choice-of-law issues) would disappear. An FTSA would also
assist courts by providing them with a large, national pool of
precedents instead of their current, smaller state-based pools. At
present, each state has its own, autonomous body of trade secret
precedent. Courts in populous states with innovative industries
have larger bodies of precedent. To illustrate, from 2000 to 2009,
there were 293 trade secret decisions from California state courts
and 120 such decisions in New York state courts; over the same
time period there was one trade secret decision in Wyoming state
courts, four such decisions in North Dakota state courts, and five
such decisions in Vermont state courts.113 Courts in smaller states

110

28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (defining the civil procedure mechanism of supplemental
jurisdiction).
111
Id. § 1338(a).
112
See id.
113
I searched all cases in WESTLAW for each state database (i.e., California (“CACS”), New York (“NY-CS”) Wyoming (“WY-CS”), Vermont (“VT-CS”), and North
Dakota (“ND-CS”)) that satisfied the following search: ATLEAST3(“TRADE
SECRET!”) & DA(AFT 12/31/1999 & BEF 01/01/2009). This search is obviously
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thus have to address, as issues of first impression, questions of
trade secret law that have been decided elsewhere. Courts in
smaller states can and do look to other states for persuasive
authority. But those courts must still review their own authority to
ensure it does not conflict with the persuasive authority, and,
assuming it presents no conflict, courts may then choose to
incorporate that persuasive authority. These steps would become
unnecessary under an FTSA.
C. An FTSA Would Create a Precedent Vacuum, but it Would Be
Filled Quickly
One could argue that an FTSA would, upon passage, create a
vacuum in which there would be no precedent to apply. There is
some truth to this concern, as there would be some period of time
in which courts would have to develop a body of federal trade
secret law. Yet this concern will have little effect because, as a
practical matter, any FTSA should and would likely be similar to
the UTSA. As detailed above in Part I, forty-six states have some
version of the UTSA, and the other major modern trade secret
statute, the Economic Espionage Act, is itself based in large part
on the UTSA.114 An FTSA will thus not create a complete
vacuum, as courts will be able to incorporate and use UTSA-based
precedent.
Moreover, federal courts already have substantial experience
with trade secret litigation and thus will need little if any time to
get up to speed. Federal courts have long decided state-based trade
secret cases either through diversity or supplemental jurisdiction.
And since 1996, federal courts have decided trade secret cases
under the Economic Espionage Act.

imperfect, for not every case that mentions “trade secret” at least three times applies
substantive trade secret law, but it is a reasonable proxy of volume.
114
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 16, § 13.03[2] (describing how the definitions
in the Economic Espionage Act were based on the UTSA).
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CONCLUSION: ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL FTSA
The point of this Article is to demonstrate that Congress should
enact an FTSA. To reap the benefits described above, an FTSA
must have three elements. First, it must be based in large part on
the UTSA, which has experienced widespread acceptance and has
a deep well of precedent. Previous commentators have also argued
for an FTSA based on the UTSA.115
And while other
commentators have argued for an FTSA based on amending the
Economic Espionage Act to include civil actions,116 the Economic
Espionage Act is already based in large part on the UTSA and thus
accomplishes the same end. Accordingly, the first element is met
by either the independent creation of an FTSA or the addition of a
civil remedy to the Economic Espionage Act.
Second, the FTSA must preempt inconsistent state trade secret
laws, as the only way to eliminate differences between states is to
preempt state laws. This preemption is limited to state trade secret
laws as such—namely, causes of action based on the UTSA or the
tort of trade secret misappropriation. An FTSA should not
preempt the broad swath of trade secret-like laws, such as breach
of noncompetition or nondisclosure agreements. These other laws
have a long history. They have different elements and serve
different aims than trade secret laws. They should thus retain
independent status.
Third, an FTSA must have concurrent jurisdiction. An FTSA
with exclusive jurisdiction would sweep up too many state-based
causes of action, as trade secret cases often have causes of action
related to employment and contract law. A litigant should have the
option of federal or state court. This third element interacts with
the second, for while a litigant can choose federal or state court,
both courts would apply the same FTSA.
The past seventy years (from the Restatement in 1939 until
today) have confirmed that a state-based trade secret law inevitably
results in interstate differences and that these differences, in turn,
115

See, e.g., Pace, supra note 16, at 442–69.
See, e.g., Halligan, supra note 34, at 656–57 (“The time has come for the enactment
of a federal trade secrets statute. This Article recommends amendments to the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 to create a civil cause of action.”).
116
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cause a host of problems. It is time for trade secrets to join the
other types of IP at the federal level, as there are no real benefits to
keeping the state-based regime, and, as articulated in this Article,
there are at least four reasons to enact an FTSA.

